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FUENTES v. SHEVIN: THE APPLICATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS TO THE
GARAGEMAN'S LIEN IN KENTUCKY
INTRODUCTION
In 1969, the Supreme Court decided in Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp." that a Wisconsin statute allowing prejudgment garnishment
of a debtor's wages was unconstitutional as a violation of fourteenth
amendment due process.2 In Fuentes v. Shevin3 in 1972, the Court's
decision effectively called into question the due process constitution-
ality of almost every statutory provisional remedy.
The Fuentes Case
Fuentes challenged the prejudgment replevin law of Florida where-
by one could have the sheriff repossess goods held by another by filing
an affidavit that the goods were wrongfully detained. The Firestone
Tire and Rubber Company had the sheriff repossess a stereo and stove
held by Mrs. Fuentes because she had defaulted on her payments
under a conditional sales contract.4 Mrs. Fuentes claimed that she
had not made the payments because the company refused to fix the
stove and instituted action in a federal district court whereby she
challenged the constitutionality of Florida's prejudgment replevin pro-
cedures under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.5
1395 U.S. 337 (1969).
2 Id. at 342. U.S. CONST. amend. XIN7, § 2 provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....
347 U.S. 67 (1972). On May 13, 1974, the Supreme Court decided in
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974), that a Louisiana judicial
sequestration procedure, similar to the replevin statute in Fuentes, did not violate
fourteenth amendment due process, even though it allowed a creditor to obtain
sequestration of property without a hearing. The procedure provided that a
creditor would receive a writ of sequestration after he had submitted an affidavit to
a judicial authority on an ex parte basis and after he had posted a security bond.
The majority of the Court distinguished the judicial control over the process in-
volved in Mitchell from the court clerk's control in Fuentes.
Although Justice Powell, concurring, and Justice Stewart, dissenting, felt that
Fuentes had been effectively overruled, it is this writer's opinion that Mitchell has
merely narrowed some of the broad language used in the Fuentes decision. It will
be left to future decisions to establish precedent as to what types of property
deprivation are condemned under the Fuentes doctrine and what exceptions are
carved out under Mitchell. No one is suggesting the Mitchell has overruled
Sniadach, which dealt with a particular type of property (wages). At any rate,
there seems to be very little in the language of Fuentes or Mitchell which is dis-
positive of the primary issues in the Garageman's Lien: "taling" of property or
action "under color of state law".
4 Id. at 71.
5 Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954, 956 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
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The district court found that no issue of due process was involved
and held for the creditor.
The Supreme Court upheld Mrs. Fuentes' argument and reversed
the district court. The Court held that even a "temporary, nonfinal
deprivation of property is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in the terms
of the Fourteenth Amendment"6 and that the prejudgment replevin
provisions "... work a deprivation of property without due process of
law insofar as they deny the right to a prior opportunity to be heard
before chattels are taken from their possessor."7
The effect of Sniadach, Fuentes, and Reitman v. Mulky8 on pro-
visional remedies9 in the United States has been widespread and con-
tradictory. California statutes involving innkeepers' liens,' 0 claim and
delivery," and garageman's liens12 have been held unconstitutional as a
denial of fourteenth amendment due process. Kentucky's landlord dis-
tress warrant 13 and claim and delivery 4 statutes have received the same
treatment, as have provisions of New York's personal property law per-
mitting attachment of wages without an order of court,'5 Alabama's
detinue statute,'" West Virginia's improvers lien,'7 and Georgia's
garageman's lien.'8
In Adams v. Egley19 a United States district court held that the
self-help remedy provided for in California's Commercial Code sec-
tions 9-503 and 9-504 (identical to Uniform Commercial sections
9-503 and 9-504) [hereinafter cited as UCC] were unconstitutional
because they encouraged and authorized creditors to repossess without
due process. However, this decision was reversed in Adams v. Southern
California First National Bank.20 Other state versions of UCC 9-503
6 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 85 (1972).
7id. at 96.
8 887 U.S. 369 (1967). Reitman was a civil rights case, and some courts have
distinguished it as being inapplicable to the debtor-creditor situation. See text ac-
companying note 64 infra.9 A provisional remedy is one of a temporary nature, ordinarily designed to
secure property or to prevent its destruction pending iudicial proceedings.
' 0Ki v. Jones, 315 F. Sup. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
"1Blair v. Pitchess, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
1Qubcv. Bud's Auto Service, 105 Cal. Rptr. 677 (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct., App. Dep't 1973). See Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles,
520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974) and Quinones v. S. & K. Chevrolet,
2 CCH Pov. L. REP. II 16,060 (Solano County Super. Ct. Cal. June 29, 1972).
13 Holt v. Brown, 336 F. Supp. 2 (W.D. Ky. 1971). See 73 Ky. OF. ATry
GEN. 24 (1973).
14 Thompson v. Keegee, 375 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Ky. 1974) (three judges
sitting).
1' Bond v. Dentzer, 362 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), re'd, 42 U.S.L.W.
2502 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 1974).
16Ytsv. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 362 F. Supp. 520 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
17" Straley v. Cassaway Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.W. Va. 1973).
IsMsnv. Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
29338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973).
20492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973).
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and 9-504 which have been held constitutional since Fuentes are those
of Virginia,2 ' Florida,22 Tennessee,23 Illinois, 24 Minnesota2 5 and Ne-
braska.26
The Sixth Circuit, based on Fuentes, has also held that it is a denial
of due process for a utility company to terminate services without a
hearing.27 The Eighth Circuit is in agreement,28 but the Seventh
Circuit has held otherwise.
29
The Garageman's Lien in Kentucky
It is clear from Fuentes and Sniadach that any statute which allows
a creditor, through a local or a state official, to take possession of
property from a debtor, even on a temporary basis, without prior
notice and an opportunity for a hearing will not satisfy the due process
requirements of the fourteenth amendment. Whether the retention of
property by an individual to whom the property has been voluntarily
delivered is a "taking" of the property under due process standards
when the individual retaining the property has acted in accordance
with a provisional remedy statute which allows him to do so without
the aid of any local or state official is a question which will be devel-
oped in detail in this article.
Ky. R&v. STAT. § 376.270 [hereinafter cited as KRS] allows a person
in the business of repairing motor vehicles to detain a motor vehicle in
his possession until he has been paid for his work.30 KRS § 376.280
21 Greene v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972).
22 Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinley, 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973).
23 KInch v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 367 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
24jono v. Associates Fin. Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D. InI. 1973).2 5 Bjchel Optical Labs. Inc. v. Marquette Natl Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir.
1973)9 6 Pease v. Havelock Natl Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972).
27 Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973).2 8 Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated
as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972).29 Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
SO Ky. REv. STAT. § 376.270 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRS] provides that:
Any person engaged in the business of selling, repairing or furnishing
accessories or supplies for motor vehicles shall have a lien on the motor
vehicle for the reasonable or agreed charges for repairs, work done or
accessories or supplies furnished for the vehicle, and for storing or keep-
ing the vehicle, and may detain any motor vehicle in his possession on
which work has been done by him until the reasonable or agreed charge
therefore has been paid. The lien shall not be lost by the removal of the
motor vehicle from the garage or premises of the person performing labor,
repairing or furnishing accessories or supplies therefore, if the lien shall
be asserted within six (6) months by filing in the office of the county
clerk a statement showing the amount and cost of materials furnished or
labor performed on the vehicle. The statement shall be filed in the same
manner as provided in the case of a mechanic's and materialman's lien,
after the removal of the vehicle, unless the owner of the vehicle consents
to an additional extension of time, in which event the lien shall extend
for the length of time the parties agree upon. The agreement shall be
reduced to writing and signed by the parties thereto.
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permits this individual to sell such property after 30 days without a
judicial hearing if the charges have not been paid.2 ' KRS § 376.275
gives this same right to one in the business of storing vehicles if the
charges have not been paid within 60 days.3 2 Although KRS § 376.270
allows the garageman a lien on the vehicle even if it has left his pos-
session, the requirements for enforcement of this lien are the same as
those for the Mechanic's Lien,33 which involve a judicial proceeding
before the property can be attached or sold. This procedure appears
to meet the due process requirements of Fuentes.
The constitutionality of Kentucky's Garageman's Lien34 depends
upon two factors: (1) whether the action taken by the garageman is
under "color of law" and (2) whether this action amounts to a
"taking" of property under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
1. COLOR OF LAW
,42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other persons within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.2 5
31K.RS § 376.280 (Supp. 1974) provides that:
(1) Any boat or motor vehicle remaining in the possession of a person
who has made repairs, performed labor or furnished accessories or sup-
plies therefor an to whom the charges for such repairs, labors, acces-
sories or supplies has been owing for a period of more than thirty (30)
days, may be sold to pay such deferred purchase money or charges. The
proposed sale shall be advertised pursuant to KRS Ch. 424, and notice
thereof shall be sent by certified mail, return receipt requested or by
registered mail to the owner of the boat or motor vehicle and to any other
person known to have any interest therein, addressed to such persons at
their last known addresses, at least ten (10) days before the sale is held.
32 KRS § 376.275 (1971) provides that:
Any person engaged in the business of storing or towing motor vehicles
shall have a lien on the motor vehicle for the reasonable or agreed
charges for storing or towing the vehicfe, as long as it remains in his
possession. If after a period of sixty (60) days the reasonable or agreed
charges for storing or towing a motor vehicle have not been paid, the
motor vehicle may be sold to pay the charges after the owner has been
notified by registered letter of the time and place of the sale. This lien
shall be subject to prior recorded liens.
33 KRS § 376.010 (1971).
34 KRS § 376.270 which allows the possession and KRS § 376.280 which
provides for the subsequent sale are treated together in this article as the garage-
man's lien since KRS § 376.280 is simply the enforcement provision of KRS §
376.270.
3542 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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Jurisdiction over § 1983 actions is given to the district courts in 28
U.S.C. § 1343:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of
citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States.36
The majority of cases discussed herein have arisen under § 1983,
and jurisdiction has either been granted or denied under § 1343 based
on the "color of law" provision.
In Fuentes the Supreme Court had no problem with the "color of
law" issue since the actual repossession of the appliances had been
undertaken by the sheriff based on an affidavit supplied by the
creditor.37 The Court stated that "[T]he constitutional right to be
heard is a basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair
process of decision making when it acts to deprive a person of his
possessions."38
Reitman v. Mulky39 is a Supreme Court case upon which many
courts have relied when faced with a "color of law" issue. In Reitman
the issue involved an article of the California Constitution 0 which
prohibited the state from denying the right of any person to sell his
property to anyone he chose. The Court concluded that this article
involved the state in private racial discrimination to an unconstitu-
tional degree and upheld the California Supreme Court's decision
that a constitutional provision repealing an existing law forbidding
racial discrimination encouraged and authorized racial discrimina-
tion.4
1
Relying on Reitman, the District Court for the Northern District of
California found that the California innkeeper's lien, whereby an
innkeeper could impose a lien on personal effects of a person, was
the sole basis upon which an innkeeper was authorized to sell property
without a judicial hearing.42 Therefore, this statute encouraged private
3628 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
37 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
s8 Id. at 80 (emphasis added).
30 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
40 CAL. CONST. art I § 26.
41 Id.
42 At common law an innkeeper was required to accept travelers and therefore
the innkeeper's lien was necessary to protect him against loss. The court reasoned
that Calfornia's innkeeper statute was not based on common law since the
reason for the common law no longer existed.
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action sufficient to place it within the "color of law".43 As will be
developed at a later point in this Comment, purely private action
between individuals is not enough to bring such action within the
"color of law". It is only when the state becomes a party. to the en-
forcement of such actions that the "color of law" argument becomes
pertinent.
A. The Common Law Argument
The District Court for the Northern District of California in Klim
v. lones44 and the Supreme Court in Fuentes distinguished the statutory
provisional remedies involved in those cases from the provisional
remedies that were available at common law. The involvement of
the State of Kentucky in allowing the possessory lien of a garageman
and the subsequent sale for charges has substantive connotations
which must be resolved.
Holdsworth 45 traces the development of possessory liens back to
certain tradesmen prior to 1371. Gradually, the law developed and
the rules were defined so that in order to maintain a possessory lien
the "... . work done must have improved the chattel, and . . . the
possession of the person asserting it must be exclusive."40 In addition,
".... the right of the person who [had] a lien [was] only to retain, and
he [had] no right to sell."
47
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, interpreting section 2739h-1 of
CAnoiL's CODE (now KRS § 376.270) stated that:
We think that the first section of the act which merely gives a
lien to the garage for repairs[,I accessories[,] and storage is but
an expression of the common law. Before the enactment of the
statutes on the subject, mechanics and repairmen could retain a
machine, whether an automobile or not, for the reasonable
charges incurred in making repairs thereon at the instance of the
owner or his representative, and this part of the act does not en-
large the common law, but merely reasserts it.48
The Court found that while the sale provision of the statute, Cmimou.'s
CODE 2739h-2, (now KRS § 376.280) did not exist at common law, the
enactment of the legislature nonetheless conformed to fourteenth
amendment due process requirements.
49
The importance of the common law argument lies in the fact that
43 Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
44 Id.
45 7 W.S. HoLDswoRTH, A HISoY OF ENGLISH LAw (1926).
46 Id. at 512.
47 Id. at 513.48 Willis v. LaFayette-Phoenix Garage Co., 260 S.W. 364, 366 (Ky. 1924).
49 Id. at 368.
1138 [Vol. 69.
if a statute has merely codified the common law, i.e., the remedy
would be available absent the statute, there is not sufficient state
involvement in the action to warrant a fourteenth amendment due
process challenge. The fourteenth amendment applies only to state,
not private actions." However, in Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc.,51
the Sixth Circuit, deciding that state regulation of a utility company
was sufficient state involvement to prevent termination of service to a
customer without a hearing, stated:
Statutes, ordinances and regulations which codify the common
law are no less actions of the state than are laws which create new
offenses, restrictions or regulations, or which otherwise alter the
common law.5
2
Thus, the common law argument, although persuasive to the effect
that the lien statute does not involve state action, is not conclusive.
Additionally, the enforcement provision of the lien, KRS § 376.280,
was not based on the common law.5 3 If the garageman cannot sell an
automobile on which he has a lien, it does him little good simply to
maintain possession and to incur greater storage costs each day.
Sniadach and Fuentes were concerned with deprivations of use of
property and removal of possession prior to a hearing. In both cases
the state was involved because it issued the order of garnishment,
and it was a local official who did the actual repossessing. However,
no state official ever need become involved (except the county court
clerk who is authorized to transfer title to a motor vehicle pursuant
to the statute) under the Kentucky garageman's lien law. The garage-
man maintains possession of the automobile and can eventually sell
the car without the intervention of any state or local official.54 An
action under the Kentucky garageman's lien can therefore be distin-
guished from Fuentes in two areas: the sale does not involve any
state officials and there is no "taking" since the car is voluntarily
delivered to the garageman.
B. State Involvement-The UCC Cases
The Reitman holding seemed to indicate that almost any action by
the state would be sufficient to bring a subsequent action under the
"color of law" provision of § 1983. Following this line of reasoning, it
can be argued that the state is involved in action taken by the garage-
man, because he effects the sale of property pursuant to statute; and
50 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
51479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973).
52 Id. at 163.
53 Willis v. LaFayette-Phoenix Garage Co., 260 S.W. 364, 366-67 (Ky. 1924).
54 KRS § 376.280 (1971).
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the county court clerk is authorized to effect the transfer of title pur-
suant to KRS § 376.280. However, in 1973 the Supreme Court decided
Moose Lodge 107 v. Irvis55 which held that even though the state of
Pennsylvania had granted a liquor license to a private club that
practiced racial discrimination, this did not sufficiently involve the
state in private action to amount to a deprivation of fourteenth
amendment equal protection rights. The Court stated:
However detailed this type of regulation may be in some par-
ticulars, it cannot be said to in any way foster or encourage
racial discrimination. Nor can it be said to make the State in any
realistic sense a partner or even a joint venturer in the club's
enterprise.56
The result of the Supreme Court's holdings in Reitman and Moose
Lodge has been that the lower courts have subsequently determined
the extent of state involvement in private actions based upon which
decision they see as controlling. A court which views Moose Lodge
as determinative is likely to hold that the state is not involved in the
private action, while one which follows the reasoning of Reitman is
more likely to find state involvement in almost any private action.
After Fuentes a number of actions were brought seeking to in-
validate Sections 9-503 and 9-504 of the UCC.57 The holdings in these
cases can be applied by analogy to Kentucky's garageman's lien,
because § 9-503 allows a secured creditor to repossess property after
default through self-help as long as it can be done without a breach
of the peace and § 9-504 provides for a non-judicial sale of such
property as long as the sale is "commercially reasonable" and notice
of the sale is given to anyone with an interest in the property. The
corresponding provisions of the garageman's lien state that possession
may be maintained until the charges are paid 5s and that the garage-
man may sell the automobile after 30 days a) if the charges have not
been paid, b) if notice is provided through advertisement in a local
paper over a period of three weeks 9 and c) if a registered or certified
55 407 U.S. 163 (1973).
56 Id. at 176-77.5 7 UMNvotM CotmWERaCU CODE §§ 9-503, 9-504 [hereinafter cited as UCO].
On September 20, 1974, the Sixth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Ten-
nessee version of U.C.C. § 9-503 in Turner v. Impala Motors, No. 73-1826 (6th Cir.
Sept. 20, 1974). Although the court had Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct.
1895 (1974), upon which to rely, the court focused instead upon the analysis con-
tained in previous U.C.C. cases. See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. The
court found, essentially, that there was no state action involved because 5 9-503
was a codification of common law, and the creditor had not invoked the aid of any
state machinery. Turner v. Impala Motors at 8.
58KRS § 376.270 (1971)
59gKRS § 376.280 (1971) provides that the public notice shall be in accord
(Continued on next page)
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letter is sent to the owner's last known address at least 10 days prior
to the sale.60
The UCC cases have almost universally held that § 9-503 and §
9-504 do not violate due process rights, because the action taken by
the secured creditors is not under "color of law". The cases arrive at
this holding by stating that Sections 9-503 and 9-504 are codifications
of the common law6' or by focusing on the fact that there is no
involvement by a state official.62 Adams v. Southern California First
National Bank63 makes the most cogent argument in support of the
constitutionality of UCC Sections 9-503 and 9-504. The sections are
constitutional, Adams holds, because the remedies provided do not
sufficiently involve state action to violate § 1983. In so holding, the
Ninth Circuit was relying in part upon Moose Lodge and distinguished
the actions taken under the UCC from those involved in Reitman.
The court found that the enactment of the UCC provisions did not
abrogate existing common law but codified it and that action taken
under the UCC does not involve racial discrimination. The court
stated:
Unlike Reitman, there has been no finding that it was the intent
of the State in passing § 9-503 to authorize any conduct that would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. And unlike racial discrimina-
tion cases in general, which have evidenced a pattern of intentional
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
with KRS ch. 424 which provides in part that:
When an advertisement is for the purpose of informing the public and
the advertisement is of a sale of property or is a notice of delinquent
taxes, the advertisement shall be published once a week for three suc-
cessive weeks....
KRS § 424.130(1)(c) (1971).
60KRS § 376.280 (Supp. 1974).
61Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 824 (9th Cir.
1978); see also Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617, 622 (Fla.
1973) (Florida version of UCC § 9-503 "is no more than a codification or restate-
ment of a common law right and a contract right recognized long before the
promulgation thereof and creates no new rights.").62 Bichel Optical Labs., Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th
Cir. 1978) (Bank seizure of accounts receivable without notice not under
color of law' or violation of Fuentes requirements because Fuentes concerned
with prejudgment seizures by state agents); Adams v. Southern Cal. First
Natl Bank, 492 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1973); Kinch v. Chrysler Credit Corp.,
867 F. Supp. 436 (S.D. Tenn. 1973) (Action not under color of law be-
cause nothing of the nature of a "symbiotic relationship" between the state and
the creditor, citing Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1973); Johnson v. As-
sociates Fin., Inc. 365 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D. IlI. 1973) (UCC §§ 9-503 and 9-504
not violative of due process because not under "color of law" since the UCC
drafters were not attempting to evade constitutional requirements but were allow-
ing private decision-mang); Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23
(N.D. Cal. 1972) ("To say . . . that all human behavior which conforms to
statutory requirements is 'State action' or is 'under color of State law' would far
exceed not only what the framers of the Civil fights Act ever intended but com-
mon sense as well.").
63492 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1973).
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indirect circumvention of constitutional rights, these creditor rem-
edies were based on economically reasoned grounds of very long
standing.... 64
With respect to the concept of "color of law", the court said:
The objective finding that the creditors in part acted with
knowledge of and pursuant to state law is but one element of the
action taken under color of state law requirement; alone it is not
sufficient. The test is not state involvement, but rather is sig-
nificant state involvement. Statutes and laws regulate many forms
of purely private activity, such as contractual relations and gifts,
and subjecting all behavior that conforms to state law to the Four-
teenth Amendment would emasculate the state action concept.65
The majority opinion at the present time is clearly that the pro-
visional remedies of self-help repossession and subsequent non-judicial
sale as provided for under UCC Sections 9-503 and 9-504 are constitu-
tional. If these particular remedies do not violate due process, it
follows that the garageman's lien, which authorizes a sale of property
already held by the creditor, cannot be said to be a greater de-
privation of property without due process.
Hawkland, discussing the UCC self-help remedy in conjunction
with the holding in Moose Lodge, concluded:
It may be doubted that the enactment of a declaratory statute
which does not compel anyone to engage in the challenged con-
duct will be considered a 'significant involvement' of the state in
that conduct. For identical reasons it seems to me that common law
doctrine and declaratory statutes that give a creditor the right to
withhold goods, or to exercise a right of set-off or foreclosure with
respect to property that has been voluntarily placed in his pos-
session by the debtor, will pass constitutional muster.
66
Other authorities disagree, however. Anderson believes that if, ac-
cording to Fuentes, one cannot use the judicial process to repossess
goods without notice and a hearing then "... . there is an inconsistency
in permitting the creditor to bypass that protective rule . . . and [to]
repossess without judicial aid."67 It has also been observed that:
*.. under most existing statutes the garage owner may deprive the
owner permanently through the extra-judicial process of public
sale. These statutes then become, in practice, more oppressive than
the pre-judgment remedies previously held unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court.
8
64 Id. at 333.
65 Id. at 330-31.
66 W. D. Hawkland, The Seed of Snfadach: Flower or Weed, 79 CASE &
COMMENT 3, 21 (1974).
67 R. ANDmasoN, UNIFoRM COMMECIL CoDn 267 (Supp. 1973-74).
68 Case Note, Garageman's Liens--Procedural Due Process-A Prejudgment




Some writers concluded that possessory lien statutes are unconstitu-
tional because they "... . provide a means by which an alleged debtor
can be deprived of the use and title to his property without ...a
hearing to determine the validity of the underlying claim...."69 These
statutes also give a garageman too great an economic lever because
the customer might pay an excessive charge when faced with the less
desirable alternative of being unable to use his property.70
H. TAING OF PRoPERTY
Because the garageman holds the debtor's property as a result of
its voluntary delivery into his possession, he does not "take" the
property in the Fuentes sense. However, the garageman can eventually
sell the property without a judicial hearing-which thus "takes" the
title from its original possessor. The problem is whether this "holding"
and "selling" amounts to a taking of property without due process.
Magro v. Lentini Bros. Moving and Storage Co.71 was one case
wherein possession was voluntarily relinquished. In Magro a warehouse-
man had stored furniture and had later sold it because the moving and
storage charges were not paid. Faced with a challenge to the validity
of UCC Sections 7-209 and 7-210,72 the court concluded that since
the property had already been sold, the declaratory judgment sought
was not a proper remedy in this case.73
However, the court also found that the property involved, house-
hold furniture, could not qualify under Sniadach as those types of
"goods[,] the deprivation of which will drive the debtor 'to the wall'."74
After discussing the prior cases which had held replevin statutes un-
constitutional, the court stated:
All of the above cases, however, involved a taking of property from
the possession, either actual or constructive, of the debtor. The
statute under attack here, however, cannot come into play without
possession first being surrendered to the warehouseman.75
The court additionally found that the sale provision, UCC § 7-210, did
not operate to deny the plaintiffs due process of law, because the type
69 Comment, Constitutionality of North Carolina's Statute Concerning Pos-
sessory Liens on Personal Property, 9 WAKE FopEsT L. REv. 97, 107 (1972).
70 Note, The Application of Sniadach to Bankers' and Garagemans Liens, 4
Sw. U.L. BEv. 285, 304 (1972).
71338 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), affd 460 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961 (1972).
72 UCC § 7-209 gives a warehouseman a lien against bailed goods covered
by a warehouse receipt. UCC § 7-210 allows the warehouseman to sell bailed goods
in a "commercially reasonable manner" after notifying all persons with a con-
tinuing interest in the goods.7 3 Magro v. Lentini, 338 F. Supp. 464, 469 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), affd, 460 F.2d
1064 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961 (1972).




of goods involved required the availability of summary action; a prior
hearing would have done nothing but weaken the security.76 It
should be pointed out, however, that the facts of the case undoubtedly
had a great deal of influence on the court's decision. The plaintiffs
had been represented by counsel, and the actual sale had been de-
layed several times to allow the plaintiffs the opportunity to pay the
charges. Moreover, there was no dispute over the amount of the
charges.
In Huber v. Union Planters National Bank77 the Sixth Circuit held
that a replevin action under which the sheriff took possession of a car
before a hearing did not deprive the plaintiff of the due process
afforded by Fuentes. The bank had originally taken the car under
the UCC self-help provision of Article 9, but the plaintiff had retrieved
the car from the bank parking lot. Subsequently, the car was towed
to a service station because it had been illegally parked. The bank
replevied the car from the service station lot and eventually sold it.
The court reasoned that the car was not technically in the plaintiff's
possession and that Fuentes was only concerned with a hearing
before chattels are taken from a possessor.78 Although the plaintiff
was deprived of property in the first self-help action, the court noted
that it was not contested by the plaintiff and thus was not an issue
in the case. The possession thereafter was "tenuously held" by the
plaintiff because it resulted from an "unauthorized 'self-help' recovery",
and the subsequent replevin action did not take the automobile from
the plaintiff's possession.79
In Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc.80 a New York dis-
trict court had upheld the State's possessory lien law and sale pro-
visions, but was subsequently reversed by the Second Circuit. In
Hernandez, the plaintiff's auto was towed to the defendant's garage
after an accident. Despite the plaintiffs instructions that nothing was
to be done to the car, it was repaired. The plaintiff refused to pay
and was notified that the defendant would enforce his garageman's
lien at a public sale 21 days after the notice. The plaintiff asserted
that a municipally licensed public auctioneer was a state official and
asked for an injunction restraining the enforcement of the challenged
act. Holding that the auctioneer did not qualify as a state or local
official, the district court denied the injunction.8 ' The district court
76 Id.
77 491 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1974).
78 Id. at 849-50.
79 Id. at 850.
80346 F. Supp. 313 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd, 487 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1973).
81346 F. Supp. 313, 316 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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did not reach the issue of whether the garageman's action was one
under "color of law", because it held that the plaintiff had not suf-
fered a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution.8 2 The
court reasoned that the plaintiff had voluntarily placed the auto in
the defendant's possession and had thereby given the defendant a
property interest entitled to possession. 3 Under New York law, the plain-
tiff's proper remedy was to pay the amount he claimed he owed into
court, i.e., the towing charges, replevy the property from the posses-
sion of the lienor,84 and institute an action on the merits of the claim
for repairs. The court, citing Magro, decided that the public sale pro-
visions of the lien law were not violative of due process because the
owner had been notified of the sale and was given ample opportunity
to challenge the debt through court action, which is all that is man-
dated by the Constitution. 85 The Second Circuit reversed. Because
the statute provided for sale without judicial hearing and due to the
fact that there was a genuine dispute as to the debt involved, the
court held that the statute was unconstitutional under the principles
enunciated in Fuentes and Sniadach.88 Concurring opinions also ques-
tioned whether the "voluntary transfer" reasoning of Magro was still
valid after Fuentes.87 The concurring judges advanced the thesis that
the lien law was an even greater deprivation of a significant property
interest than replevin, because replevin procedures normally preserve
the integrity of goods while an action on the merits is commenced.
The sale provision of the lien law extinguishes any possibility of
future repossession.8
8
The district court's ruling in Hernandez was also criticized in
Mason v. Garris.80 The Mason court found that the sale provision of
Georgia's lien law violated due process because it permitted fore-
closure on liens and subsequent sale without notice or an opportunity
for a hearing. The court found that the garageman had only a security
interest in the goods and that it was the owner who had the "use"
interest. 0 Therefore, the court stated:
Since the Supreme Court, and this court have held that statutes
cannot constitutionally allow one who has a propriety [sic] in-
terest in goods to take them from the user of the goods without
82 Id.
83 Id. at 818.
84Id.
85 Id. at 319.
86 487 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1973).
87 Id. at 384 (Timbers and Lumbard, JJ., concurring).
88 Id. at 385.
89 860 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
9o Id. at 424.
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abiding by procedural due process, it follows a fortiori that statutes
cannot constitutionally allow one who has only a security interest
in goods to take them from the user without abiding by pro-
cedural due process.91
The one feature which seems to distinguish Magro from Hernandez
and Mason is that in Magro, as in Fuentes, there was no dispute as to
the amount of the charges. However, in recent cases involving Sec-
tions 9-503 and 9-504 of the UCC, there was no dispute as to the
amount owed; the only dispute centered around the method of enforce-
ment of the security interest. Thus, the issue becomes crystallized:
the supporters of Sniadach and Fuentes argue that notice and a hear-
ing are required in all self-help cases, whether there is a dispute
as to the debt or not. In contrast, the opposing viewpoint insists that
the requirement of notice and a hearing unduly burden the legal
process where there is no dispute as to the debt.
Mason can be distinguished from the Kentucky garageman's lien
law sale provision. In Mason there was no requirement of notice,
while the garageman's lien law specifically requires it. However,
notice was also required in Hernandez, and even with such a require-
ment the Second Circuit held that the self-help remedy vioJated due
process.
A. The Notice Requirement
KRS § 376.280 requires that notice of the sale of an automobile
must be provided in accordance with the provisions of Ch. 424 of KRS.
In addition, the section further requires that a registered or certified
letter be sent to the last known address of the owner of the car.
It would appear that this should be sufficient to satisfy any due
process requirements, since the debtor then has the opportunity to
challenge the debt by initiating court action. However, this was the
sort of reasoning the Second Circuit rejected in Hernandez. Others
have criticized such statutory language because the notice require-
ment contained therein only "... provides that the owner be informed
of the proposed sale of his property; it is not notice of an opportunity
to be heard on the amount or validity of the claimed lien."
92
Although there is ample opportunity for the debtor to bring an
action, as well as statutes which allow the debtor to file a bond and
sue in replevin for the property,03 it has been held that "[t]hese
91 Id.92 Comment, Constitutionality of North Carolina's Statute Concerning Posses-
sory Liens on Personal Property, 9 WAxE FoREST L. REv. 97, 103 (1972).
93KRS § 382.063 (1971).
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remedies, though, fall short of the rationale and minimum legal re-
quirements set forth in recent authority."9:
B. Kentucky's Garageman's Lien in Federal Court
In the recent case of Cockerel v. Caldwell,95 a three judge district
court for the Western District of Kentucky declared the sale pro-
vision of Kentucky's garageman's lien (KRS § 376.280(1)) uncon-
stitutional. Cockerel had authorized towing services for his auto-
mobile, but disputed his authorization for repairs and refused to pay
these charges. When the plaintiff was notified that the car would be
sold to satisfy the repair charges, he requested injunctive relief, class
action certification, and a declaration that KRS § 376.280(1) was un-
constitutional. The class action certification was denied.9 6
The three judge court, in a 2 to 1 decision, declared KRS §
376.280(1) unconstitutional, prohibited the sale of the automobile,
and permanently enjoined the clerk of the Jefferson County Court
from effecting transfers of title pursuant to the provisions of KRS §
376.280(1).97
In deciding that the statute was unconstitutional, the majority9"
relied upon the reasoning of Hernandez which had applied Fuentes
and Sniadach to a similar fact situation. The fact that the plaintiff
voluntarily delivered the car to the defendant was of little significance
to the majority. The finding that there was a deprivation of a sig-
nificant property interest in the automobile was enough to satisfy the
requirement of a "taking of property".99
The majority also found that the statute provided sufficient state
action to invoke jurisdiction. Applying the reasoning of Reitman v.
Mulky 00 and Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc.,0.1 the majority determined
94Holt v. Brown, 336 F. Supp. 2, 6 (W.D. Ky. 1971).
95 Cockerel v. Caldwell, Civil Action No. 789-A (W.D. Ky. Apr. 22, 1974)
Sthree judges sitting). After a subsequent hearing on the constitutionality of KRS
376.270 [the possessory lien provision], the majority held that provision of the
statute constitutional. Although recitin the decision in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant
Co., 95 S. Ct. 1895 (1974), the court ound that it was not dispositive and relied
instead upon the balancing test of Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles to
decide the issue. [The language of this balancing test is set out in the text accom-
panying note 111 infra.] Even in light of Mitchell, KRS § 376.280(1) is still un-
constitutional.
Judge Bratcher, in dissent, would have held the entire statute unconstitutional
based upon his interpretation of Mitchell. See text accompanying note 103 infra.
90 Id. at 4.
97 Id.98 Lively, Circuit Judge and Allen, District Judge.
99 Cockerel v. Caldweli, Civil Action No. 7892-A at 3 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 22,
1974).
100 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
101 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973).
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that "... statutes ...can be considered actions of the state, even
where they codify the common law, when the consequence of the
statute enables private citizens to act in derogation of the Con-
stitution."
02
In his dissent, Judge Bratcher concluded that there was not
sufficient state involvement in the action of the defendant to invoke
a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, relying in part upon the
holdings of Oller v. Bank of America'03 and Kinch v. Chrysler Credit
Corp.10 4 He further concluded that "[t]he fact that the state has
enacted legislation does not, per se, create 'state action',e ' 0 5 and stated
that the notice of sale provisions of the statute gives the customer
ample opportunity to challenge the garageman's lien. 0 6
In Bond v. Dentzer'07 the Second Circuit reversed a district
court ruling that New York's wage assignment law was unconstitu-
tional, stating that they were unable to find that the challenged statute
involved the state within the legal conceptualizations of partnership,
encouragement, or traditional state function. 08 It is doubtful that
the Kentucky garageman's lien statute involves the state as a partner
in any action upon the lien, and an argument that the existence of
the statute encourages such actions is tenuous. However, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has held the sale provision of that state's
garageman's lien law unconstitutional' 09 on dual grounds: (1) the
garageman is acting in a traditional state function and (2) the sale of
property without a prior hearing violates the due process require-
ments as enunciated in Fuentes. In its holding the California court
stated:
The vehicle service lien and the procedures for its enforcement
are created and governed by statute. The procedure is admin-
istered by the Department of Motor Vehicles, and transfer of title
... is ultimately recorded by the department. Thus, although a
private individual retains and sells the car, his power to do so
arises from and is subject to specific provisions of state statute and
his exercise of that power is supervised by the department.
... Even more importantly, by statutes authorizing and em-
powering Stellato [the garageman] to sell the car and requiring the
1o2 Cockerel v. Caldwell, Civil Action No. 7892-A at 4 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 22,
1974).
108 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
104 367 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
105 Cockerel v. Caldwell, Civil Action No. 7892-A at 8 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 22,
1974) (Bratcher, J., dissenting).
106 Id.
107 42 U.S.L.W. 2502 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 1974).
108 Id. at 2503.
109 Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145
(1974).
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department to recognize and record transfer of title, the state
delegated to Stellato the traditional governmental function of lien
enforcement and enabled him to pass good title to an automobile
he did not own." 0
In the same decision however, the court upheld the California
statutory provision which allows the garageman to retain possession
of the automobile until he is paid because:
The provisions permitting interim retention of the automobile
without prior notice or hearing do not violate due process prin-
ciples. The garageman has a possessory interest in a car left for
him to repair with his own labor and materials. Thus, he has an
interest that, in a sense, is superior to that of a conditional vendor
or chattel mortgagee. Moreover, at the time he asserts his lien,
the garageman is in rightful possession of the vehicle. Striking
down the garageman's possessory lien would alter the status quo in
favor of an opposing claimant; the garageman would be deprived
of his possessory interest.l
CONCLUSION
Even in the face of the district court's ruling that KRS § 376.280(1)
is unconstitutional, a strong and cogent argument can be made that
the state does not violate due process requirements. UCC Sections
7-209 and 7-210 provide virtually the same remedy for warehouse-
men as KRS § 376.270 and 376.280 provide garagemen, and these
provisions have been upheld.112 UCC sections 9-503 and 9-504 even
allow a secured creditor to retake possession of the property through
self help and to subsequently sell it. These provisions have withstood
several court tests.11 Reasoning by analogy, it seems clear that if the
application of UCC Sections 9-503 and 9-504 do not deprive a person
of significant property interests or involve state action, then KRS §§
376.270 and 376.280 are constitutionally sound as well.
The foremost argument that Kentucky's garageman's lien, especially
the sale provision (KRS § 376.280), is unconstitutional is the rationale
adopted by the California Supreme Court,14 that is, a) that the
garageman is acting in a traditional state function and b) that the
sale of property without a hearing violates due process. Moreover,
it should be noted that, essentially, KRS § 376.280(1) allows a
garageman to proceed with the sale of another's property even
110 Id. at 965.
111 Id.
112 Magro v. Lentini, 338 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
113 See text accompanying footnotes 61, 62, and 63 and cases cited therein.




though it has never been established that he has a valid claim under-
lying the sale.
The garageman should be allowed to hold the property until he is
paid for his work. To require the garageman to surrender an auto-
mobile on which he has expended labor and parts without compen-
sation is just as much a taking of property without due process as the
situation cited in Sniadach and Fuentes. The proper remedy available
to the owner is to replevy the property simply by filing a bond and
initiating an action to determine if the property is being held im-
properly.1 5 The property interests of the garageman and the owner
have to be balanced at some point, and thus it appears reasonable
that in exchange for the security of the property, the garageman
should receive some assurances that he will receive the value of his
labors. If the owner does not dispute the charges or authorization
or if he does not respond to notification that the auto will be sold to
pay for the charges, then the garageman should be able to proceed
with a non-judicial sale. It seems unreasonable to require the garage-
man to go to the expense of a court action if the owner has abandoned
the vehicle or does not dispute either the amount of the charges or
his authorization for the repair work.
However, if there is a dispute on the garageman's underlying
claim, he should not be allowed to simply sell the property without a
judicial determination of the validity of the claim. In Sniadach the
Court stated:
* . . due process is afforded only by the kinds of notice and hear-
ing which are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the
probable validity, of the underlying claim against the alleged debtor
before he can be deprived of his property or its unrestricted use."16
In Bond v. Dentzer".7 a New York federal district court stated that
due process
* .. is the notion that society must recognize a moral obligation to
see that disputes are resolved on the basis of their merits rather
than on the basis of the relative power of the contestants."
8
The property interests of the garageman and the automobile owner
must be balanced. It appears that the best solution is to amend Sections
376.275 and 376.280 of KRS to provide the following: When the owner
115 KRS § 383.063 (1971).
116 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
"17 362 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 42 U.S.L.W. 2502 (2d Cir.
Mar. 13, 1974).
118 Id. at 1384, citing B. CmsTENsEN, LAwYERs FoR PEoPLr OF MODERATE
MEANs 79 (1970) (cited in Brown, A Meaningful Opportunity to be Heard, 46 ST.
MARY's L. 11Ev. 25 (1971).
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of the automobile disputes either the amount of the charges or his
authorization for the repair work, the garageman must use the same
procedure to enforce his possessory lien as he would use to enforce a
non-possessory lien, viz., he must act in accordance with KRS §
376.270, which provides that before the property can be attached or
sold, there must be a judicial proceeding. Thus, if the garageman
wants to sell the automobiles he will bear the burden of proving the
validity of his claim. However, if he merely proposes to retain
possession under his lien, the burden then is placed on the debtor
to persuade the court to alter the status quo and allow him to regain
possession of his automobile.
The retention of possession by the garageman is a "temporary,
non-final deprivation" of the use of property as spoken of in Fuentes,
that is, it is a "taking" of the automobile and the owner is deprived
of its use. However, one should note the nature of the situation in
which the retention arises (the voluntary delivery of the automobile
to the garageman), the special character of the lien, and the absence
of direct state action. The result of this combination of factors is that
the retention does not amount to a "taking" of property in the sense
of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.
Roger L. Crittenden
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